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Abstract 
In recent times, as much as 75% of pediatric prescription drug use has been "off label," 
or used in the absence of FDA approval. Increasingly, this off label use came to be seen 
as problematic, since noble goals of protecting children as vulnerable research subjects 
had the unintended effect of making every child an inadvertent experiment. The Best 
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act and the Pediatric Research Equity Act were passed by 
Congress in 2002 and 2003 respectively and reauthorized in 2007 to solve this problem. 
But how successful have they been? We triangulate methods, reviewing literature, 
analyzing public documents, and content analyzing elite interviews, to evaluate 
legislative success. We conclude that the Acts are achieving their intended purposes, 
but we make recommendations to strengthen their success. 
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The Problem 
Pediatric therapeutics use is "off label" from 50 to 75% of the time (Roberts et al. 
2003) because many commonly used medications lack U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval for pediatric indications. The unique problem in pediatrics 
is that off-label use is frequently the only kind of use possible, because so many 
therapeutics lack FDA approval for pediatric indications. 
In recent history, children have been viewed as too vulnerable to be research 
subjects, and a variety of such ethical and moral concerns have joined economic and 
liability questions to obviate drug safety and efficacy testing in children most of the time. 
This is, in part, because children represent a vulnerable population. Children are 
vulnerable because they are not "autonomous:" they cannot give informed consent. 
Additionally, "minimal risk" for adults is often judged to be "significant risk" for children. 
For example, additional blood samples required for an adult clinical trial pose minimal 
risk to an adult research participant, but drawing additional blood samples from a young 
child or infant for research purposes, rather than as a part of care, may pose more than 
minimal risk, or even significant risk. Thus, enrolling children as healthy controls has 
usually been seen as ethically and morally unacceptable (Office for Human Research 
Protections, Department of Health and Human Services 2000; hereafter DHHS). 
The complicated nature of conducting pediatric clinical trials, the smaller target 
population compared to adults (as there are fewer "eligible" children because serious 
conditions are rare in children), and high cost paired with the lack of incentive for 
pharmaceutical companies (as many physicians would continue to prescribe off-label 
regardless of indication), have combined to discourage studies of more than a few drugs 
in the pediatric population. 
Despite these challenges, we must do pediatric therapeutics research. Children 
who are treated with medications that have not been adequately evaluated in the 
pediatric population are at risk of known and unknown adverse events. Children are not 
"small adults;" further, growing children are not even like themselves a short time in the 
past. Children's developmental, physiological, and even genomic profiles vary across 
populations and are in an almost constant state of change. Children's rates of drug 
metabolism and toxicity profiles change as they grow and develop. For all these 
reasons, extrapolating from adult data to children is not an adequate solution. 
The noble goal of protecting children, as vulnerable subjects, from the risks of 
clinical research has the ironic unintended consequences of leaving those who care for 
children with an insufficient evidence base, and of making every child an inadvertent 
experimental subject. 
Current policy results from past abuses 
Recent history is noteworthy because it sheds light on the latest policy changes. 
We might assume that the view of children as a readily exploitable source of research 
subjects would have changed following exposure of the notorious twin studies in 
Auschwitz, where one twin was subjected to an unthinkable experiment while the other 
served as control, and the adoption of the Nuremburg Code, which prohibited coercive 
research and research without consent. In fact, highly controversial research on children 
continued after World War II, exemplified by the Willowbrook School hepatitis 
experiments during the 1950s and 1960s in which healthy mentally retarded children 
were intentionally inoculated with the hepatitis virus and then monitored to gauge the 
effects of gamma globulin treatment. These events galvanized public sentiment against 
pediatric research and lead to the moral position that children must be protected from 
being exploited as research subjects. A virtual but informal prohibition on most research 
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in children finally became formal policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Belmont 
Report 1979; "Additional Protection for Children Involved as Subjects in Research," 
[1983]1991 ), 
These new federal controls on pediatric human subjects research, however, 
arose in an environment of explosive growth in the number of drugs, devices, and 
biologics available to physicians. The two phenomena intersected to produce an 
unintended consequence, immediately recognized by pediatricians (American Academy 
of Pediatrics 1977): when few children have been participants in therapeutic research, 
then virtually every child becomes an inadvertent experimental subject. 
In 1979, the FDA first issued regulations that required the presence of pediatric 
information on the drug label and package inserts if the pharmaceutical company 
marketed the drug to children. If a drug had not been tested for safety and efficacy in 
children, then the label had to indicate as much. Unfortunately, this rule did not 
stimulate pharmaceutical companies to conduct pediatric testing, they simply chose to 
market drugs with labels asserting that the product had not been tested for safety and 
efficacy in children (Wilson 1999). Samuel Maldonado MD MPH, Vice President for 
Pediatric Drug Development at Johnson and Johnson, argues that the 1979 rule was not 
the FDA's intent to stimulate pediatric drug development. On the contrary, Dr. 
Maldonado said: "The pediatric section of the label was introduced as a subsection of 
the 'Precautions' section. It was as if the FDA was telling physician 'beware of the use of 
this drug in children' ... [not] until the labeling reforms of 2007 did things change, but since 
this change is so recent, most labels still have their pediatric information under 
'Precautions.' ... In any case, most pharmaceutical companies didn't intent to market or 
promote their product to the pediatric population because it was not commercially 
attractive to do so" (Maldonado interview, 2008). 
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By the mid-1990s, the FDA, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), and 
others were beginning to quantify the dilemma (Roberts et al. 2003). Advocates for 
better information on the safety and effectiveness of therapeutics used in pediatric 
medicine pushed pediatric human subject research onto the public agenda again. This 
time, the policy question became one of considering how to move beyond prohibitions 
toward constructing policy to assure that pediatric research minimizes harm while 
producing maximum therapeutic benefits. 
The 1994 Pediatric Rule. The 1994 Pediatric Labeling Rule was another 
attempt by the FDA to boost the amount of pediatric information contained in the label; 
there was some concern that the reason pharmaceutical companies didn't respond to 
the 1979 version of the rule was because they thought they would actually have to 
conduct the pediatric studies in order to qualify for a label. The 1994 Pediatric Labeling 
Rule applied to already marketed drugs and introduced the idea that adult efficacy could 
be extrapolated to the pediatric population if the course of the disease and expected 
response to therapy were sufficiently similar in the adult and pediatric populations (Code 
of Federal Regulations part 201, 59 Federal Register 64240 1994; hereafter CFR). 
While the 1994 Pediatric Rule did not make any new efficacy testing mandatory, it did 
require companies to review their existing data to determine if they could lead to 
pediatric information, and they would still be required to do testing for dosing and safety. 
The 1994 Pediatric Rule maintained the requirement that any manufacturer who did not 
submit valid information about pediatric safety and effectiveness include a disclaimer on 
its labels that the drug had not been tested for safety and efficacy in children. 
Unfortunately, this attempt to stimulate pediatric labels failed. An analysis 
conducted in 1998 concluded that only 15% of supplements submitted to the Agency in 
response to the 1994 Pediatric Rule resulted in adequate pediatric labeling (Rodriguez, 
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Roberts and Murphy 2003; CFR part 201 59 Federal Register 64240 1994). Samuel 
Maldonado told us that the ", .. reason for this apparent failure was that the Pediatric 
Labeling Rule presupposed that the data exited in the sponsor's databases and that it 
was only a matter of forcing the sponsor to submit the data to the FDA. However, the 
assumption that the data existed was wrong. Sponsors could not submit what they didn't 
have" (Maldonado interview, 2008). 
The FDA Modernization Act. In 1997, President Clinton signed into law the 
FDA Modernization Act (FDAMA). Section 111 provides for 6 months of additional 
marketing exclusivity, often described as patent protection, for drug manufacturers who 
conducted pediatric studies on their products in response to a written request issued by 
the FDA (FDAMA 1997). This incentive, albeit not stand-alone until it was enacted 
separately as the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act in January 2002, is known as 
the pediatric exclusivity provision. The exclusivity provision is voluntary and applies to 
new or already marketed drugs. The 6 month period of market exclusivity is linked to the 
active moiety that may be present in many products, thus a sponsor who is granted 
pediatric exclusivity for conducting pediatric studies earns the exclusivity benefit for all 
products with the same active moiety that have existing patent protection, in particular its 
adult formulations, not just the indication for a new use and/or new population. Notably, 
the pediatric exclusivity provision does not require the manufacturer to seek a label 
change in order to earn the 6 additional months of market exclusivity. The provision only 
requires that the pediatric studies be completed in the requested timeframe and 
according to FDA specifications. 
To further the study of off-patent drugs, the passage of FDAMA also required the 
FDA-in consultation with experts in pediatric research- to develop and publish a list of 
drugs, including off-patent drugs, for which additional pediatric information may be 
beneficial. The NIH lists these drugs annually in the Federal Register (DHHS NIH 72 
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Federal Register 14588 2007) and charges the National Institute for Child Health and 
Human Development (NICHD) with seeking contracts to develop the pediatric data 
analyses. 
The 1998 Pediatric Final Rule. On the heels of the failed 1994 Pediatric Rule, 
the FDA published a new rule, the Final Rule, in December 1998, and it took effect in 
April1999 (21 CFR Parts 201,312,314 and 601,63 Federal Register666321998). The 
1998 Pediatric Final Rule required that any new drug or biologic application or 
supplement contain an assessment of the drug in the pediatric population unless a 
deferral or waiver is granted by the FDA. For example, it routinely granted such waivers 
for New Drug Applications for new drugs to treat benign prostatic hypertrophy (BPH), 
since BPH is not a pediatric condition. The Final Rule can be applied to new 
applications, including a new active ingredient, new dosage form, new dosage regimen, 
new route of administration, and new indications (except for orphan drugs). The deferral 
clause was intended to allow manufacturers to submit the required pediatric studies after 
submission of a biologic licensing application or NDA, e.g., when a new drug for adult 
use already has approval but before pediatric studies are completed. The main reason 
for the deferral clause was to avoid preventing adults from gaining access to beneficial 
drugs while pharmaceutical companies completed pediatric studies. 
The Final Rule attempts to balance the needs of children with the needs of 
adults. The Final Rule also allows the FDA to require studies on drugs that are already 
marketed if, first, it is used in more than 50,000 pediatric patients for a labeled indication 
and there is inadequate labeling that could pose significant risk, i.e. drug products have 
substantial use in the pediatric population, or second, it is determined that the marketed 
drug will provide a meaningful therapeutic benefit over exiting treatments and the 
absence of adequate labeling poses a significant risk (Rodriguez, Roberts, and Murphy 
2003). 
6 
Controversy leads to change: conflict over the Pediatric Rule 
Although children's health advocacy groups, pediatricians, and some politicians 
supported the FDA's ability to make pediatric testing mandatory and considered the 
Final Rule to be a great victory, others did not. The Association of American Physicians 
and Surgeons, Competitive Enterprise Institute, and Consumer Alert filed a lawsuit in 
2000 that challenged the authority of the FDA to promulgate the Pediatric Final Rule; 
they argued that it would delay new drug approval and give the FDA lawmaking power 
beyond the limits set by Congress. In November 2001, the American Academy of 
Pediatrics (AAP), the Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation, and the Pediatric 
Academic Societies filed an amicus curiae brief in the lawsuit supporting the Pediatric 
Final Rule. 
In March 2002, under pressure from the Bush administration, the FDA 
announced a 2 year suspension of the Pediatric Rule during which time it would study 
whether the rule was needed in light of the passage of BPCA. Just one month later, the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) reversed this decision after strong 
objections from the children's advocacy groups and members of Congress. They 
announced that they would continue to enforce the Rule and defend it in court. In 
October 2002, the Pediatric Rule was overturned by Judge Henry J. Kennedy of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia on the grounds that the FDA lacked the 
statutory authority to promulgate the Pediatric Rule and that the Pediatric Rule and the 
BPCA were incompatible (Assoc. of Am Physicians and Surgeons v. US FDA 2002). 
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The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2002 
As it came to be, this decision was only a temporary interruption to the process of 
regulating pediatric drug development. The January 2002 enactment of the Best 
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (hereafter BPCA) renewed and expanded the pediatric 
exclusivity provision in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (BPCA 2002). BPCA allows 
FDA to grant drug sponsors 6 months of additional market exclusivity in exchange for 
conducting and reporting on already approved and new drug studies. 
BPCA also provides mechanisms for pediatric drug studies that drug sponsors 
decline to conduct. The process for initiating pediatric drug studies under BPCA formally 
begins when FDA issues a written request to a drug sponsor to conduct pediatric drug 
studies for a particular drug. When a drug sponsor accepts the written request and 
completes the pediatric drug studies, it submits reports to the FDA describing the studies 
and the study results. BPCA specifies that FDA generally has 90 days to review the 
study reports to determine whether the pediatric drug studies met the conditions outlined 
in the written request. If FDA determines that the pediatric drug studies conducted by 
the drug sponsor were responsive to the written request, it will grant a drug pediatric 
exclusivity regardless of the study findings. 
The FDA may issue written requests for those drugs on the list that it determines 
to be most in need of study. When drug manufacturers decline written requests for 
studies of on-patent drugs, BPCA provides for FDA to refer the study to Foundation for 
the National Institutes of Health (FNIH) for funding. FNIH is a nonprofit corporation 
independent of NIH and supports the mission of NIH by linking private sector donors and 
partners to NIH programs. As of December 2005, FNIH had raised $4.13 million to fund 
pediatric drug studies under BPCA (US Government Accountability Office, GA0-07-
898T 2007; hereafter GAO). 
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If the drug manufacturer declines or fails to respond to the written request, the 
NIH can contract for, and fund, the pediatric drug studies. Drug sponsors generally 
decline written requests for off-patent drugs because the financial incentives are 
considerably limited. A drug does not need to be on the list to be eligible for the 
exclusivity incentive. 
The Pediatric Research Equity Act Codifies the Pediatric Rule. 
In January 2003, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a press 
release that contained a list of 12 commonly prescribed drugs that needed to be tested 
for use in children for which government supported testing would begin that year (DHHS 
2003). The list, to be updated each year, was developed by the National Institute of 
Child Health and Hurnan Development (hereafter NICHD) in consultation with the DHHS' 
FDA and experts in pediatric research. Most written requests issued by the FDA have 
been for drugs on this list. The press release acknowledged that most of these drugs 
are no longer under patent and therefore not the exclusive property of any single drug 
firm. For this reason, the BPCA provided for government sponsorship of these pediatric 
drug trials. 
The press release also announced that for pediatric testing of new drugs, DHHS 
would take separate action. Secretary Thompson announced that the administration 
would seek new legislation from Congress to establish without further question the 
FDA's authority to require pharmaceutical manufacturers to conduct appropriate 
pediatric clinical trials on new drugs and biologics. He said legislative authority would be 
pursued because it was quicker and more decisive than legal appeals. The press 
release pointed out that FDA earlier asserted its right to require such tests, but the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia ruled against the agency in October 2002 
(Assoc. of Am Physicians and Surgeons v. US FDA 2002). 
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In March 2003, Senators Dodd (O-CT), DeWine (R-OH), and Clinton (D-NY) 
introduced legislation, the Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA) that would codify the 
1998 Final Pediatric Rule (21 CFR 63 Federal Register 66632 1998). All three senators 
had long-established interest in improving pediatric research, and something like the 
PREA had been talked about before the Association of American Physicians and 
Surgeons v US FDA decision. In July 2003, the Pediatric Research Equity Act was 
unanimously passed in the Senate and in November 2003, PREA passed the House on 
a voice vote (PREA 2003). President Bush signed PREA into law in December 2003. 
Under PREA, the FDA has clear Congressional authorization to require drug 
manufacturers to conduct pediatric studies as part of new drug development if the drug 
has potential for use in the pediatric population 
BPCA and PREA reauthorized in 2007 
The 2007 reauthorization of BPCA and PREA (BPCA 2007; PREA 2007) 
contains several noteworthy improvements. The criteria for applying PREA to already 
marketed drugs are enhanced. New language allows the FDA to use a "benefit" standard 
as opposed to a "risk" standard to require studies. When a voluntary study is declined 
by a drug company, the reauthorized version of PREA provides for an expedited 30-day 
review of private funding before referral of declined written requests to PREA. The 2007 
reauthorization also increases the authority of BPCA; it allows the FDA to issue one 
study request for more than one use of a drug and to capture both on- and off-label uses 
and to ask for preclinical studies as part of the written request. Once studies and/or 
assessments have been conducted under BPCA and PREA, the Secretary must make a 
determination whether the drug studied is safe and effective in pediatric populations or 
subpopulations, including whether the results are inconclusive. The label must then 
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include the information about whether the study results were positive, negative, or 
inconclusive along with a statement of the Secretary's determination. 
The 2007 reauthorization contains several mandates to increase the 
transparency of programs and the dissemination of pediatric information. The FDA is 
required to make BPCA written requests public after the drug has been granted 
exclusivity, to track the number and type of studies completed as well as labeling 
changes and other data resulting from BPCA and PREA. The Secretary must also now 
make publicly available the actual medical, statistical, and clinical pharmacology reviews 
for studies completed under BPCA and PREA (not just the summaries). Drug 
companies that conduct studies under BPCA and PREA must provide physicians and 
other health care providers with new pediatric labeling information annually. 
The review and oversight of BPCA and PREA have also been strengthened; new 
language establishes an internal FDA review committee for BPCA and PREA and asks 
the Institute of Medicine to review past study requests, make recommendations to the 
FDA for future study requests, and make recommendations for incentives to encourage 
the study of biologics in children. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is also 
required to produce a report on the results of BPCA and PREA with recommendations 
for improving the programs. 
Safety reporting has also been strengthened; manufacturers must submit all 
post-market adverse events as part of the BPCA exclusivity provision. Drugs studied 
under PREA are also subject to mandatory adverse event reporting and one-year review 
by the Pediatric Advisory Committee. The Pediatric Advisory Committee is extended 
through October 1, 2012. 
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The Current Landscape of Pediatric Research 
It is apparent that initial efforts to regulate and stimulate pediatric drug 
development were weak, calling for voluntary action, and action on already approved or 
off-patent drugs. Subsequently, two laws, the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act 
(BPCA 2007) and the Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA 2007), were enacted to 
incentivize, and then require, the pharmaceutical industry to conduct pediatric clinical 
trials and improve pediatric drug labeling. These acts evolved over the past decade and 
most recently were modified and reauthorized in 2007. BPCA is commonly referred to 
as a "carrot," that is, an incentive that rewards sponsors with a six month period of 
market exclusivity in the form of a patent extension for conducting pediatric studies and 
reporting the results in a timely fashion. PREA codified the Pediatric Final Rule and is 
commonly referred to as a "stick" that requires sponsors to study the safety and 
effectiveness of all new drugs and biologic products for their claimed indication, dose, 
and method of administration in all relevant pediatric subpopulations, unless a deferral or 
waiver is granted by the FDA. Both acts are meant to increase the safety of pediatric 
prescribing and improve the quality of the drug label information available to pediatric 
providers and families. 
In less than a decade, we have moved from a position of testing very few 
therapeutics in pediatric populations- the leading exceptions being vaccines, where 
pharmaceutical companies' markets were large enough to justify surmounting research 
obstacles -to 842 requested studies (357 Written Requests) projected to include over 
49,000 pediatric patients (FDA Pediatric Exclusivity Statistics, Breakdown 2008). The 
BPCA has led thus far to new labeling for pediatric indications on 148 previously 
approved drugs as a result of written requests from 1998-2007 (FDA Pediatric 
Exclusivity Statistics, Label Change 2008). In addition, PREA has motivated 64 pediatric 
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indications on newly approved drugs since 2002 (FDA Pediatric Exclusivity Statistics, 
PREA 2008). 
The hard numbers suggest that BPCA and PREA have stimulated pediatric 
research. Although this may be true, our policy analysis of the issue uncovered several 
points that warrant further evaluation and policy recommendations. First, we critically 
analyzed the success of the legislation by way of review of the biomedical literature, 
public documents, and analysis of structured interviews with elite stakeholders who are 
especially knowledgeable about the effects of the laws. The interviews revealed that the 
success of the laws is more complex than the number of requested studies and 
subsequent label changes. For example, we considered whether the pediatric studies 
are conducted in the most commonly prescribed pediatric drugs, or whether the pattern 
of study correlates more directly to the economic value of the incentive when it is linked 
to the active moiety in the adult indication. Second, even if the riumbers indicate the 
laws have been successful, we feel it is critical to consider whether the results of such 
studies will actually influence caregivers' prescribing practices. The studies are 
meaningless and their results are not helpful to the practice of medicine if caregivers do 
not have sufficient and user-friendly access to the study results and, more importantly, 
can consistently apply the results to their pediatric patients. The crux of this issue rests 
on whether or not physicians and other prescribers reliably use the drug label as a 
source of information, and if not, what can be done to ensure they have access to and 
actually utilize a summary of the new safety and efficacy findings that result from studies 
conducted under BPCA and PREA. 
We uncovered another central question: Who should pay for these pediatric 
studies? The current incentive system is structured such that although the drug 
manufacturers fund the up-front cost of the studies, the taxpayers indirectly fund the 
incentive by paying higher costs for brand name medications while the production of 
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generics is halted until the expiration of the exclusivity provision. Although the cost to 
conduct pediatric studies can be high, and appears to be rising, where should the 
economic burden rest? 
The elite interviews also revealed a dilemma faced by drug manufacturers and 
contract research organizations: how can they conduct the studies requested by the 
FDA successfully and ethically? The increased demand for pediatric studies highlights 
the need for clear ethical standards, particularly as they relate to the use of placebo, 
especially in the context of increasingly globalized clinical trials. 
Finally, structured elite interviews and the systematic review suggest that we are 
still far from an ideal world in pediatric clinical research. Several research areas are 
insufficiently addressed by the current legislation. We conclude with policy 
recommendations about disseminating information, addressing unmet therapeutic 
needs, and improving the incentive structure. 
Methods and Hypotheses 
We used standard policy analysis methods to study the effects of the Best 
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA) and Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA) on 
pediatric drug development, labeling, and use. Policy analysis combines qualitative and 
quantitative approaches and is a triangulation of methods, including a review of 
biomedical literature, review of public documents, and content analysis of interviews with 
key elite stakeholders from carefully selected local and national organizations (Auerbach 
and Rockman 2002; Berry 2002; Goldstein 2002; Hochschild 2005) 
We conducted a systematic review of the biomedical literature, and its results are 
presented in the next section. We also reviewed public documents, including public 
laws, the official FDA website, court testimony, and the Code of Federal Regulations. 
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Elite interviews 
We conducted structured interviews with elites who represent the four domains of 
government, academe, industry, and advocacy, to triangulate perspectives on policy 
behavior. We identified 17 elites, using a combination of positional and reputational 
selection criteria, who were most likely to have critical insights into the policy process. 
We did this in order to impose a "process tracing" structure on the analysis. "Process 
tracing" is deliberately non-probabilistic in its sampling, since the objective is to trace the 
causal mechanisms in the emergence of a policy; with such a research purpose, 
anything like a "random sample" of elites risks missing those who have the most 
knowledge of the policy. Instead, "process tracing" depends on enough familiarity with 
the policy to be able to identify the specific positions from which elites might have the 
broadest, best-informed perspective on policy development (Tansey 2007). Our 17 
requests for interviews produced 11 completed in-depth telephone interviews (see 
Appendix 2 for the list of respondents by position and date of interview, and Appendix 3 
for the interview protocol). The 6 elites who did not permit interviews either did not 
respond to our request or did not feel comfortable being interviewed, or we could not 
arrange a convenient date for the interview. Of the 11 interviews, 3 were from academe 
(Duke University, Cincinnati Children's Hospital, Dartmouth), one of whom had also had 
industry experience, and another had had government experience. Two elites were from 
advocacy (American Academy of Pediatrics), 2 were from industry (Quintiles and 
Johnson & Johnson), 2 from government (FDA and the National Institute for Child Health 
and Development), and we obtained one additional interview from an elite who 
represented two domains: she had been an advocate for pediatric research as an officer 
of the Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation while the legislation was being 
developed, but she had become a staff member in the House of Representatives Energy 
and Commerce Committee by the time of the interview. As this discussion, Appendix 2, 
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and their subsequent comments all make clear, these elites are intimately familiar with, 
and in some cases helped to shape, the BPCA and PREA, and give us the best 
opportunity of identifying policy causes and likely effects (Auerbach and Rockman 2002; 
Hochschild 2005). 
We designed the structured interview template to contain 6 questions, with 
follow-up questions, to test two original hypotheses. The first hypothesis was that BPCA 
and PREA in their current forms have had minimal effect on pediatric drug labeling. 
More specifically, we hypothesized that the number and significance of label changes 
under PREA has been limited, and that few drugs eligible for market exclusivity under 
BPCA have achieved this endpoint. The rationale for this hypothesis is that BPCA is a 
voluntary incentive, and, although the consequences of non-adherence to PREA (or 
failure to submit the assessment as requested) are such that the drug may be 
considered misbranded and subject to relevant enforcement action, the FDA has not yet 
imposed such draconian action, and we felt the mere threat may not be severe enough 
to motivate pharmaceutical companies to carry out the necessary testing. Pediatricians 
are accustomed to off-label prescribing and are likely to continue to do so for the 
foreseeable future, because even with the new laws, off-label use is still the most 
common prescription drug use in pediatric medicine. 
Further, it is possible that many manufacturers completed pediatric studies in 
order to get six month market exclusivity provisions for adult label indications, but had no 
apparent intention ever of seeking a pediatric label indication for a previously approved 
drug. Finally, the BPCA incentive is not necessarily highly lucrative for sponsors (li et 
a!. 2007), because the cost of conducting the necessary trials is high, and the likely profit 
from marketing to the pediatric population may be low. Members of Congress (such as 
Senators Dodd, Clinton, and DeWine) recognized the limits of BPCA's inducements and 
punishments, and tried to ameliorate those weaknesses with the passage of the PREA, 
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which would at least compel pediatric labeling for new drugs. Subsequent 
reauthorizations of both acts have reiterated the pediatric requirements for new drugs, 
but have not mandated pediatric studies in previously approved drugs unless the DHHS 
Secretary determines that a drug can confer benefit to a pediatric patient, and can 
therefore require pediatric studies. 
The second original hypothesis was that the most recent amendment to PREA 
and BPCA, a mandate that drug labels include all study results along with the FDA's 
determination as to whether the clinical trial results were positive, negative, or 
inconclusive, may further discourage sponsors from conducting the appropriate trials. 
Inclusion of negative information on the drug label, such as "lrbesartan, in a study at a 
dose of up to 4.5 mg/kg/day, once daily, did not appear to lower blood pressure 
effectively in pediatric patients ages 6 to 16 years," (Bristol-Myers Squibb 2007) may 
cause drug manufacturers to be reluctant to perform pediatric clinical trials in already 
marketed drugs, as such information could negatively affect their economic success in 
the pediatric market, particularly when physicians practice in a climate where off-label 
prescribing is commonplace and will likely continue regardless of whether pediatric 
studies are conducted. 
The interview fact sheet, protocol, and consent were approved by the Public 
Health-Nursing Institutional Review Board at the University of North Carolina. The 
interviews were transcribed and the transcriptions were systematically coded to capture 
counts, concepts, and illustrations. 
Systematic Review 
I performed a PubMed search using the keywords, "pediatric" and "exclusivity" 
and "legislation." This search returned abstracts for 15 research articles. I reviewed the 
list to ascertain that it contained "sentinel articles." I then performed a second PubMed 
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search using just the keywords, "pediatric" and "exclusivity." This search returned 9 
additional research articles. I used the following inclusion criteria for abstract review: 
mention of pediatric exclusivity, the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, pediatric drug 
labels, or the ethics of conducting research in children. I did not review abstracts if they 
were not available, if they were not written in the English language, and/or full text was 
not available online. These inclusion/exclusion criteria left 13 abstracts for which I then 
performed full article review. Two additional abstracts were identified by hand-searching 
the reference lists of the original articles. In summary, I identified 3 original research 
articles, 1 systematic review, 2 policy analyses, and 7 review articles. The table of 
evidence resulting from the systematic review appears as Appendix 3. 
I reviewed the articles according to study design, appropriateness of use of study 
design, results, quality of results, and overall conclusion about quality- poor, fair, good, 
excellent- of evidence. Criteria for each overall conclusion category were as follows: 
excellent = very thorough article with no apparent bias; good = less thorough with no 
apparent bias; fair= limited scope and/or biased; poor= inaccurate and/or biased. As 
the majority of the articles identified were either review articles or policy analyses, I used 
special consideration for the evaluation of bias. If the author's point of view was clear 
and transparent, he/she dealt fairly with the evidence, even if it opposed his/her 
perspective, and policy recommendations were grounded in appropriate evidence, then I 
graded the article as non-biased. I assessed in original research articles by evaluating 
for confounding, selection, and measurement bias. I constructed an evidence table to 
summarize the findings of the systematic review. Of note, full text of the additional 
abstracts identified by hand-searching of the reference lists was not available for review, 
but the abstracts contained relevant information and were included in the evidence table. 
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Legislative Success 
The numbers suggest success 
BPCA and PREA have stimulated many pediatric studies and label changes; as 
of June 2008, 842 requested studies have been requested (357 Written Requests) and 
are projected to include over 49,000 pediatric patients (FDA Pediatric Exclusivity 
Satistics, Breakdown 2008). BPCA has led to new labeling for pediatric indications on 
149 previously approved drugs as a result of written requests from 1998-2008 (FDA 
Pediatric Exclusivity Statistics, Label Change 2008). In addition, PREA has motivated 64 
pediatric indications on newly approved drugs since 2002 (FDA Pediatric Exclusivity 
Statistics, PREA 2008). 
The success of BPCA is often quoted in the literature, "This incentive has been a 
driving force stimulating the conduct of pediatric studies" (Roberts et al. 2003, 906). Li 
and colleagues said "This program has been successful from many perspectives 
resulting in a substantial increase in pediatric drug research compared with the very 
limited amount of such research before pediatric exclusivity" (2007, 480). The success 
has also been represented under oath at the court hearing for the 2007 reauthorization 
of BPCA and PREA. The testimony of Samuel Maldonado, Vice President of Pediatric 
Drug Development at Johnson & Johnson, said "No regulatory effort or legislation before 
these has come close to stimulating the kinds of advancements in pediatric drug safety 
and effectiveness that we've seen over the past decade" (2007). In the course of 
conducting this policy analysis, we reached a similar conclusion: more pediatric clinical 
trials have been conducted since the passage of BPCA and PREA than were conducted 
before the laws were on the books. 
The significance of the results of studies completed under BPCA and PREA is 
also often quoted in the literature, "In nearly half of the drugs studied, there were 
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unexpected results in dosing, safety, or efficacy compared with adult studies, including 
failure of half of the antihypertensive dose-response trials, which are pivotal for deriving 
dosing recommendations" (Benjamin et al. 2008, 834). Mathis and lyasu (2007, 133) 
described what probably was the set of trials attracting the most media attention, that of 
the SSRis: 
Following the presentation of the pediatric safety reviews to the Pediatric 
Advisory Committee, stronger warnings were added in labeling for all five 
of the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressants 
studied under the BPCA because of an increase in suicidal thinking in 
children and adolescents taking this class of medication. A warning was 
also added regarding the neonatal withdrawal syndrome, identified in 
infants born to mothers using SSRis in the third trimester. 
Our initial conclusion, then, and the judgment of the experts, is that our original 
hypothesis is not supported: numerous important dosing and safety and efficacy 
findings - or the lack thereof have made their way into drug labels as a result of studies 
conducted under BPCA and PREA. 
Across the board, the elite stakeholders also shared this sentiment. All 11 
respondents agreed that BPCA was generally an attractive "carrot" for sponsors. 7 had 
a strongly positive global impression of BPCA and 4 had a positive impression. Their 
opinion of the success of BPCA is best summarized by a quote from pediatric 
pharmacologist Daniel K. Benjamin, MD MPH: " ... the only people who don't believe the 
program has been a success are ... the kind of people who say the world is flat" 
(Benjamin interview 2008). 
Further, although the BPCA does not require a label change for the drug 
manufacturer to earn market exclusivity (the requested studies only need to be 
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conducted within the requested timeframe), the elites generally did not believe that 
pharmaceutical companies had frequently "gamed the system," that is, conducted the 
requested study to earn market exclusivity without ever intending to seek a pediatric 
label indication. Three elites estimated that this occurred about 10% of the time, but 
pointed out that if a pharmaceutical companied carried out the requested studies and 
there was not a resultant label change, it could have been a consequence of a 
prolonged review process at the FDA or the determination that the data were not worthy 
of the label. Other elites did not try to estimate a number, but used language like "in a 
few instances." Samuel Maldonado of Johnson and Johnson said "the FDA has also 
evolved on this matter. We in J&J conducted a program under BPCA and gained 
exclusivity but the FDA refused to include the results in the label. A new Division Director 
had taken the lead of the Division by the time the resu Its of the study came out, and he 
disagreed with the Written Request issued by the FDA years earlier. Maldonado thought 
that this kind of "anomaly" spurred Congress, in its 2007 reauthorization of BPCA, to 
require the inclusion of pediatric studies regardless of their outcome a part of the label. 
Which drugs are actually being studied? 
Critics of the pediatric exclusivity provision question whether the pattern of study 
correlates with the most commonly prescribed pediatric drugs or the most commonly 
prescribed drugs in the adult market. Such suspicion results from the fact that the 
economic value of the incentive can be highly lucrative because it applies to all approved 
uses of the drug, not just those studied in children. Therefore, even if the studies find 
that the drug is not safe for use by children, the drug will still receive extended market 
exclusivity for the adult uses of the drug. At least one elite in industry, Dr. Maldonado, 
argued that a finding that the drug is not safe for children can spare significant morbidity 
and mortality in children. Many of the drug misadventures that occurred in the past and 
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lead to mortality in children, he argued, would not have happened in today's environment 
in which knowledge is generate under a controlled clinical trial (Maldonado interview 
2008). 
Boots et al (2007) conducted a systematic search of the literature to identify drug 
utilization patterns in children. They found that from July 1998 to August 2006, 135 drug 
entities were granted pediatric exclusivity. The most frequent drug groups granted 
exclusivity were anti-depressants and mood stabilizers, ACE inhibitors, lipid-lowering 
preparations, HIV antivirals, non-steroidal anti inflammatory, and anti-rheumatic drugs. In 
contrast, they found the most frequently used drugs by children are respiratory, systemic 
anti-infectives, and dermatologicals. They acknowledge limitations in their definition of 
essential drugs for children and that the method employed in the literature search may 
have introduced some bias toward outpatient drug consumption, thus underestimating 
the use anesthetic or cardiovascular drugs. 
Boots et al note that the drugs granted pediatric exclusivity include 5 out of the 
"Top 1 0" prescription drugs with the highest sales figures in North America in 2005: 
atorvastatin (Lipitor), simvastatin (Zocor), omeprazole (Nexium), lansoprazole 
(Prevacid), and sertraline (Zoloft). Sales of these 5 drugs amounted to $24.1 billion US 
in 2005. (IMS National Sales Perspectives 2005) Somewhat on the contrary, a report 
from the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development published in the same year 
noted that less than one-half of the medicines awarded pediatric exclusivity are in the 
top 200 selling drugs (Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, 2005). 
These apparent discrepancies could be due to bias or there could be validity in 
the numbers. Perhaps the reality is that a handful of blockbusters earn pediatric 
exclusivity and subsequent windfall profits while the majority of drugs that are awarded 
pediatric exclusivity are smaller market. 
22 
According to Boots et al, the majority of drugs granted pediatric exclusivity are 
rarely used by children, and drugs that are frequently used by children are 
underrepresented in the pediatric studies to obtain exclusivity. The authors conclude, 
"Many drug studies in children have been performed since the introduction of the 
FDAMA. However, children infrequently use the drugs granted pediatric exclusivity. The 
priorities for pediatric drug research should be set by the need of the patients, not by 
market considerations" (2007,849) To remedy this situation they recommend a portion 
of the public funds generated by postponement of generic replacements and price 
reductions be funneled away from the drug manufacturers and applied in an alternative 
manner. 
Dr. Maldonado argued that the drug companies have the expertise and 
infrastructure to conduct pediatric trials, and that the market opportunity alone creates 
the incentive to do such studies, but that the BPCA can stimulate studies where market 
incentive alone is not enough. 
As the Maldonado comment suggests, the BPCA incentive may be particularly 
important where market incentives are weaker, especially with generic drugs. Few of 
the off-patent drugs identified in the initial Pediatric Off-patent Drug Study (PODS) lists 
produced by the Secretary of HHS have been studied to date, despite the potential to 
obtain contracts to do the studies from the National Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development (NICHD). As with the PODS list, the BPCA provides for NIH to fund 
studies when drug sponsors decline written requests for off-patent drugs. By 2005, NIH 
had identified 40 off-patent drugs it recommended be studied for pediatric use. Through 
2005, FDA issued written requests for 16 of these drugs, and all but one of these written 
requests were declined by drug sponsors. The NIH funded pediatric drug studies for 7 
of the remaining 15 written requests declined by drug sponsors through December 2005 
(US GAO, GA0-07-898T 2007). Maldonado of J&J said that they declined the request 
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to study one drug, Ketoconazole, because they were advised that its use was no longer 
standard of care in the US and was not part of the WHO formulary, reducing the 
likelihood of its use in the rest of the world (Maldonado interview 2008). This does raise 
the question of determining how off-patent drugs are selected as drugs for which NIH will 
request studies. 
The GAO report cited above describes several reasons the NIH has not pursued 
the study of some off-patent drugs that drug sponsors declined to study. These include 
concerns about incidence of the disease that the drugs were developed to treat, the 
feasibility of study design, drug safety, and changes in the drugs' patent status. If the 
NIH is unwilling to conduct such trials, it is not surprising that drug manufacturers are 
unwilling to conduct them. The success of "requested studies" as a strategy to induce 
more research seems questionable if the requests are not well justified. 
The use of placebo in pediatric clinical trials 
The issue of the feasibility of this approach to generating more studies was also 
raised by two other elite stakeholders. An academic pediatrician who also has global 
industry experience said that "Many of us felt that asking NICHD ... to develop medicines 
when written requests were turned down didn't make much sense, because the vast 
majority of the time, the fact that written requests were turned down ... were just timing 
issues. The companies realized there was no way to could complete a study with the 
year and a half remaining on exclusivity. But most of the reasons for turn-down was that 
there was no way to study the disease. The studies in the written requests were 
undoable." An elite from the pharmaceutical industry echoed his concerns, "The FDA, 
the regulatory bodies ... are writing written requests ... And many of them ... absolutely 
cannot be performed. Or yes, they can be performed, but it will take about 5 years ... Or 
the patient population that they are looking for us to study doesn't exist in the United 
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States or the Western world .... because we have access to certain medications or a 
certain standard of care that precludes doing the trial. .. So that forces us to think about 
going to other areas to do it which then becomes an ethical issue ... especially if it is a 
placebo-controlled trial. So I think the lynch pin is making sure there is sort of a 
thoughtful design put forward in the written request." 
We examined a sample written request for the study of antidepressants in 
children (FDA Written Request for Antidepressants 2003). The written request is 
available on the FDA Pediatric Drug Development website. The FDA acknowledges that 
the written request is a sample and not an actual written request. Nonetheless, the 
written request is for several studies including pediatric efficacy, safety, and 
pharmacokinetics. For the efficacy studies, the FDA requests, "two randomized, double-
blind, parallel group, placebo-controlled acute treatment trials, with a recommended 
duration of at least 6 to 8 weeks." The study population is children (ages 7 to 11) and 
adolescents (ages 12 to 17) with major depressive disorder. 
Although this written request is an "N of 1 ,"it illustrates the research challenges 
inherent in placebo-controlled study requests. It is likely that many parents and 
pediatricians would be uncomfortable enrolling a child or adolescent with major 
depression on a placebo-controlled trial, even if the placebo arm entailed increased 
frequency of visits or additional support and/or counseling beyond the usual standard of 
care. 
Similar concerns have arisen in actual pediatric antihypertensive trials,and 
Pasquali et al. examined the pros and cons of 4 different designs in the study of pediatric 
antihypertensives (2002). They describe a design where patients are randomized to 
placebo or 1 of 3 different doses of the test medication and note that the placebo-
controlled design could lead to recruitment problems because parents are often 
uncomfortable with the possibility that their child may be placed on placebo. Although 
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the 3:1 randomization scheme makes it three times more likely that the child will receive 
active drug, some parents may still have significant concerns about their child's 
participation, especially if the trial drug is available off-label (Vitiello and Jensen 1997). 
The practice of placebo controlled studies in pediatrics has recently been 
addressed in the literature (Benjamin et al 2008). In their analysis of failed pediatric 
antihypertensive trials, the most common antihypertensive trial design was "type C" in 
which the use of a true placebo arm is avoided, while adding the power to obtain 
interpretable results regardless of the outcome of the trial. A type C trial employs 
randomization to 1 of 3 doses of the test medication. In addition, it includes a 
randomized withdrawal phase. At the end of the 2 week treatment period, patients are 
re-randomized to continue on their assigned treatments or to be withdrawn to placebo, 
with close follow up and withdrawal to open-label treatment at the discretion of their 
physician. Benjamin et al. conclude that because the exclusivity provision is not 
dependent on product safety or efficacy, feasibility is of far greater importance to 
sponsors than optimal trial design. Eligibility for exclusivity regardless of outcome is a 
major advantage of type C trial design, because it is considered interpretable regardless 
of outcome; avoiding the use of an explicit placebo arm makes this type of trial more 
appealing to parents of potential subjects and institutional review boards. 
BPCA and PREA work best together 
The elite stakeholders had less enthusiasm and a less positive global impression 
of PREA; several of them noted that the two laws work best together, using phrases 
such as "inextricably linked" or "synergistic." Dr. Maldonado of Johnson & Johnson 
noted, "I have to say for the most part PREA is there for those companies that are 
reluctant to ... do what's right for children ... I see the value of PREA. I think PREA alone 
might not be as effective as BPCA. You get compliance, but you don't get people, 
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thinking around a room out of the box ... what can we create? ... that is beyond PREA and 
things like that happen because of BPCA. So, most of pediatric drug development so far 
in the last 10 years has been really the engine has been BPCA and not PREA" 
(Maldonado interview 2008). We believe the respondents have this opinion because 
PREA only requires a pediatric assessment for those conditions being studied in adults 
and in which significant use or benefit in pediatrics is expected. 
PREA gets the ball rolling. Several respondents noted that one of the most 
effective components of PREA is that unlike BPCA, it stimulates conversation between 
the pharmaceutical company and the FDA early in the drug development process -a 
potentially critically important effect of the policy. 
How similar are children and adults? 
Under PREA, the Secretary may conclude that pediatric effectiveness can be 
extrapolated from adequate and well-controlled studies in adults. This begs the question 
of whether the disease being studied and the effects of the drug are sufficiently similar in 
adults and pediatric patients. One of our academic experts said that "the issue in being 
limited to the adult indication is the confidence with which we can say that the adult 
indication is indeed representative of the pediatric population. For example, let's say the 
adult indication is rheumatoid arthritis. Is JRA (Juvenile Rheumatoid Arthritis) the same 
or not? And that's what we get into in, in the FDA's attempts to use extrapolation of 
efficacy. Is the disease sufficiently similar? And again that goes to, often our lack of 
understanding of disease mechanisms. The disease that looks to be typically sort of like 
the same thing in adults and kids may not be the same disease at all. .. Those are active 
scientific discussions. But at least the agency has the authority to ask the company ' 
and what is your pediatric plan?' " 
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It is likely that as more clinical trials are conducted in pediatrics, the scientific 
community will gain a better understanding of the metabolic, genomic, and 
developmental differences between adults and children-even between children of 
varying age groups. However, a determination of whether a disease and its treatment 
are sufficiently similar in adults and children is complex and possibly fraught with danger. 
This issue is one that will likely not be amenable to further legislative amendment, but 
highlights the need for extreme caution on the part of the research community. 
Do the study results reach practitioners? 
The ultimate determinant for the success of these laws is not only whether they 
stimulate the conduct of pediatric studies, but also whether the data they generate are 
accessible to caregivers and ultimately, applied to pediatric patients. Benjamin and 
colleagues comment, "The pediatric exclusivity program has been successful from many 
perspectives, including labeling, with over 100 labeling changes to date. However, the 
subsequent dissemination of results in the peer-reviewed medical literature has not been 
previously quantified. Because few pediatric studies are performed for products primarily 
approved and marketed for adults, it is important that the information obtained from such 
studies be readily available. One standard for dissemination of human experimentation 
results is publication in a peer-reviewed journal" (2006, 1267). Benjamin et al. 
enumerated the publication of main study results in peer-reviewed journals for studies 
conducted for pediatric exclusivity between 1998 and 2004. They found that only 
1131253 (45%) of the studies were published in peer-reviewed journals. A positive 
labeling change such as "safety and effectiveness established" and "approved for use in 
children" (versus a negative labeling change such as "no meaningful clinical activity", 
"black box warning", and "increased mortality reported in the product compared to 
placebo") was observed for 127/253 (50%) of studies. Efficacy studies and studies that 
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resulted in a positive labeling change were more likely to be published. Further, they 
found that there were 100 clinical trials associated with a key labeling change (defined 
as a study that resulted in substantive dosing changes, new safety information, or lack 
of efficacy in phase Ill testing), but only 37 were published. There were 48 trials that did 
not result in a labeling change (40 from completed submissions and 8 associated with 
products that were withdrawn from the market or the application was withdrawn), and 
only 19/48 (40%) were published. Thus, 3,804 children were enrolled in 29 clinical trials 
for 16 products resulting in no labeling change and no dissemination of results. They 
conclude that dissemination of the results of these studies, particularly in peer-reviewed 
journals, is critical to ensure pediatric public health. To address this problem, they 
propose that Congress consider linking part of the incentive for completion of pediatric 
clinical trials to publication of the results in a peer-reviewed journal, an idea that 
stimulated considerable disagreement among our elites, some of whom strongly support 
the idea, and others of whom believe attempting to force peer-reviewed publication is not 
feasible, not the least because of established publication bias against publishing 
negative findings. 
The literature on dissemination of the results of studies completed under BPCA and 
PREA is sparse, but the Benjamin et al. report raises two important issues. First, the 
proportion of clinical trials completed under BPCA and PREA that are published in peer-
reviewed journals is unacceptably low. Second, the ethics of enrolling children on 
clinical trials is undeniably linked to their publication. The lack of peer-reviewed 
publication of pediatric clinical trials is unfair to the research subjects and the pediatric 
population at large. 
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Will an all-inclusive label affect practice? 
As noted, the 2007 reauthorization of BPCA and PREA requires that the DHHS 
Secretary order the labeling of the product to include information about the results of the 
study, including inconclusive results, and make a determination on whether the drug is 
safe and effective in the pediatric population. Thus, the label is a legal document that 
contains information about the results of the studies. This could possibly aid 
dissemination of information, but the several questions follow: 1.) Do pediatricians 
actually read the label? 2.) Is it possible that valuable information is not published in the 
label? 
Several of the elite respondents raised this concern during the interview. Dr. Dianne 
Murphy, Director, Office of Pediatric Therapeutics, FDA commented" ... the problem of 
course is that we don't usually use the label, we use our Harriet Lane or we use some 
other little thing that will fit in our pocket... And so I think it's a really important part of 
training and for the American Academy of Pediatrics to make pediatricians understand 
that the label is not your father's label. .. the label now for children is changing 
dynamically ... and it's going to have more information than the adult label will ever have 
about negative studies, and you need to be looking at it. It's a rich resource for you, and 
you need to begin to think of it as part of the way you approach therapeutics" (Murphy 
interview 2008). Dr. Robert Ward, Director of the Pediatric Pharmacology Program and 
Professor of Pediatrics at the University of Utah, further commented: "And for years the 
Physician's Desk Reference and the drug's label was virtually useless ... to a 
pediatrician. When I was a Fellow in clinical pharmacology in the 70's, we considered it 
a doorstop. And now it would provide a fairly accessible source of information" (Ward 
interview 2008). 
To be sure, the label is not necessarily the only information source that 
prescribers and researchers need to incorporate into to their practice. This idea was 
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reinforced by Dr. Maldonado: " ... There is a lot of good knowledge out there, published 
in peer-reviewed journals ... that is very good, but it will never be worthy of a label. I 
know what it takes to be worth the labei. .. And that doesn't mean that the academic 
knowledge is not good .... It is just that... it's been planned and designed in a way that is 
not acceptable by the standards of the FDA. Not to say that the standards of the FDA 
are higher than academia. They are different. ... So there is a good knowledge out there 
that probably won't ever be worthy of label, and if we focus on label, we are really 
missing the boat..." 
When considered in combination with the Benjamin et al. findings (2006), it is 
clear that some meaningful data that are published in the peer-reviewed journals are 
never published in the label and vice versa. This lack of consistency puts both 
prescribers and pediatric patients at risk. The comprehensive list of label changes 
posted on the FDA website is an attempt to address this problem, but again, its success 
is dependent upon whether prescribers are aware of the listing and incorporate regular 
review into their practice. 
We conclude that the label contains essential information, but it may not contain 
all of the information. Respondents repeatedly noted that the pre-specified goals of the 
writers of these laws were to stimulate labels, but if there was no resultant label, the data 
could be just as useful. Therefore, physicians must consider using the label as a source 
of prescribing information. Alternatively, and more likely to reach the masses, peer-
reviewed publication of study results should be incorporated in the exclusivity incentive, 
but in this case, both authors and journals must accustom themselves to seeing the 
value of publishing negative results. 
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Negative information in the label is practice changing 
If prescribers used the label as a source of prescribing information, the elite 
stakeholders uniformly agreed that the inclusion of negative results in the label would 
make a difference to prescribers. They felt it was a positive effect of the legislation, 
would be useful to prescribers, and had the potential to improve pediatric practice. 
The FDA's Dr. Murphy noted "that a negative study doesn't necessarily mean the 
product would never work." She further explained, "we actually now have labels which 
have information on the failed studies ... and you can understand that it doesn't mean that 
this product would never work. It just means that the way it was studied it didn't work. 
And some of [the labels] say why they think it failed. The other reason it's really 
important to have this negative information in the label is that you're never going to get 
the next study. So you need to know that when it was studied at that dose in this way, it 
didn't work ... and in some of these, not only did it not work at that dose, but we had 
serious adverse effects" (Murphy interview 2008). 
One of the academic experts echoed her concern, " ... negative results, if they're 
true negative, you act on them. But if they're negative because the study design isn't 
right or we don't understand the disease or we're missing a subpopulation that really 
benefits, I'm very much worried about that. But that's a general statement for adults and 
kids." These sentiments highlight the need for careful interpretation of the data with 
caution toward under- and over-interpretation of the results. 
Inconclusive label information may help researchers more than prescribers 
When asked whether the inclusion of inconclusive results in the label would 
make a difference to prescribers, the elites gave a mixed response. This did not 
surprise me because even the inclusion of negative results, which one might instinctively 
consider to be more "usable" than inconclusive results, elicited noteworthy caveats. As 
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described above, several elites mentioned that negative results are not necessarily 
"definitive" and the scientific community must consider this when treating children and 
designing subsequent studies. Thus, inconclusive results carry even more uncertainty 
for prescribers, although they do maintain the spirit of full-disclosure. At the very least, 
the prescriber will know that a drug has been studied in a particular pediatric population. 
Even among elite stakeholders, several of whom practiced pediatrics for 
decades, the dilemma of how to use inconclusive results was apparent. In general, they 
felt that inconclusive results may be more difficult to incorporate into practice, but that 
the data generated were important to our overall understanding of pediatric patients and 
their diseases. Dr. Richard Gorman, Chair of the AAP Section on Clinical 
Pharmacology and Therapeutics, commented on the true intent of the FDA when 
deciding to publish inconclusive results in the label, "The group that that was really 
aimed at was young researchers to keep them from going down the same blind 
alley ... and subjecting other children to the same research that would probably fail again" 
(Gorman interview 2008). 
These quotes are a further sampling of the layers of complexity that comprise the 
issue of publishing inconclusive results in the label. An elite from industry noted, " ... I 
think the net effect would be it's [the drug] going to be used as long as there are no bad 
safety signals." Mr. Mark Delmonte, Assistant Director, Department of Federal Affairs at 
the American Academy of Pediatrics, noted " ... lfthere has been a drug studied, good, 
bad or neutral. .. we should know that that drug has been studied ... in the environment of 
off-label prescribing ... more data are better than less." Finally, Dr. Donald Mattison, 
Senior Advisor to the Directors of the NICHD and the Center for Research for Mothers and 
Children (CRMC) and Chief of the Obstetric and Pediatric Pharmacology Branch in the 
CRMC, commented, "I think from a scientific perspective, making the inconclusive 
information publicly available whether it's in the label or the FDA medical reviews and on 
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the FDA website, is important, because it lays out areas where clinical trial design or 
understanding mode of action need to be improved ... 1 think it's important from a 
scientific perspective. I'm not sure that it will influence prescriber behavior." 
Transparency is essential 
Perhaps it is the concept of transparency that lies at the core of this debate. 
Publishing the results of all studies in the label may only have a modest effect on 
prescribing practice, but it prevents sponsors from conducting studies without ever 
publishing the results. The establishment of transparency may be one of the biggest 
successes of BPCA and PREA--to prevent what happened in adult medicine where 
studies were done, but the results of negative studies (and even positive or inconclusive 
studies) were never made available to the public. 
This concept was also described by Dr. Benjamin: "the agency has the ability to 
put positive and negative results into the label. .. which is unique in the pediatric 
studies ... that's actually not true for an adult study. If you do an adult study and it fails, 
unless there is some crucial public health concern, the agency actually doesn't put that 
into the label and if the company does not publish it. .. the results they buried, which of 
course draws into question the ethics of doing clinical trials and not disseminating the 
data" (Benjamin interview, 2008). 
We conclude that the inclusion of inconclusive results in the label will likely have 
minimal effect on prescriber behavior, but it is an extremely insightful way to maximize 
transparency and ensure there is at least one mechanism for sharing the results of 
pediatric studies with the public, especially in light of the fact that many studies are not 
published in peer-reviewed journals. 
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The Cost of Pediatric Research 
Although the exclusivity provision has experienced much praise, it has also 
received a fair amount of criticism. Cost is one of the most frequent issues raised by 
critics. They argue that the current incentive structure results in windfall profits for 
pharmaceutical companies and disproportionately rewards them to conduct studies for 
blockbuster drugs with minimal financial incentive for smaller market drugs (Public 
Citizen 2001 ). The incentive has potential for such significant profitability in large part 
because the 6 month period of market exclusivity is linked to the active moiety, thus a 
sponsor who is granted pediatric exclusivity for conducting pediatric studies earns that 
exclusivity benefit for all indications that include the active moiety, including adult 
indications. 
Li et al. examined this question by quantifying the economic return to industry for 
completing pediatric exclusivity trials (2007). They analyzed a cohort of 9 studies that 
were conducted for pediatric exclusivity. They estimated the cost of performing each 
study and converted the cost into estimates of after-tax cash outflows. Three-year 
market sales were also obtained and converted into estimates of after-tax cash inflows 
based on 6 months of additional market protection. They calculated net economic return 
(cash inflows minus outflows) and the net return-to-costs ratio (net economic return 
divided by cash outflows). 
The distribution of net economic return for 6 months of exclusivity varied 
substantially among products. The net economic return ranged from -$8.9 million to 
$507.9 million and net return-to-cost ratio ranged from -0.68 to 73.63. Li et al. 
concluded the economic return for pediatric exclusivity is variable; pediatric exclusivity 
can generate lucrative returns or produce more modest returns on investment. 
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As complexity increases, costs rise 
Estimates of the cost to conduct a pediatric study are highly variable. The 
National Institute of Child Health and Development estimated that a safety and efficacy 
study may cost between $1 million and $7.5 million, while the cost of a pharmacokinetic 
study can cost from $250 000 to $750 000 per age group (US GAO, GA0-01-705T 
2001 ). The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America estimated higher 
study costs, ranging from $5 million to more than $35 million. In a study based on a 
survey of drug companies, the cost of pediatric studies was estimated to average $3.87 
million per written request (Milne 2001 ). 
As our pediatric knowledge base has expanded, the complexity of pediatric 
studies has also grown. The proportion of efficacy and safety studies, which are the 
most resource-intensive and expensive type of study has increased from 25% to 40%, 
the mean number of patients required for studies in response to an FDA written request 
increased 178% between 2000 and 2006, and the time required to complete a study and 
submit a final report has nearly doubled since 2000. In 2007, the Tufts Center for the 
Study of Drug Development reported that the average cost to respond to a written 
request grew from 3.93 million in 2000 to 30.82 million in 2006, an 8-fold increase 
(2007) 
From the perspective of a contract research organization, an elite stakeholder 
commented, "if the written requests are so difficult that the companies have to put a lot 
of money on the table upfront to basically fail. .. to then go back to the FDA and say we 
can't do the study. We have tried. We've done our due diligence. We cannot get this 
population. Now that's not an absolute. You can have lots of discussion with the 
reviewers ... which is what they encourage but...sometimes ... they don't stay on 
it. .. because it's marketed ... and they're looking for new indications and trying to do this 
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500-patient, Phase Ill, safety and efficacy pediatric trial that requires 7 countries and the 
cost is double .... it's just not attractive." 
These comments underscore the need for thoughtful written requests and 
guidance from the FDA. One of the academic pediatric pharmacologists elaborated: 
" ... the FDA [should] publish this guide that insists on how to do studies .... l'll give the 
example because I did pediatric hypertension for twenty-five years .... We want you to 
take your hypertensive kids ... off medication for 2 weeks and then start them on a 
double-blind, placebo-controlled trial. Not going to happen. And any parent who would 
sign for it is crazy. And any IRB that approved it is wrong. But because the FDA said 
the study that you did in adults has to be repeated in children the, the sponsors are 
forced to do that. So what is it they do? They go to India. They go to China. They go 
to ... a private practitioner in St. Stephanie and the swamp hospitals." 
To date, the FDA has not published a comprehensive guide for the conduct of 
pediatric clinical trials, but recently Benjamin et al. in collaboration with the FDA, 
published an analysis of end points and dose range in failed pediatric antihypertensive 
trials (2008). They describe, "We found poor dose selection, lack of acknowledgement 
of differences between adult and pediatric populations, and lack of pediatric formulations 
to be associated with failures. More importantly, our ability to combine data across trials 
allowed us to evaluate and potentially improve trial design" (834). This sort of 
publication is crucial for the success of future trials and should become standard 
practice. 
Who should pay? 
The cost to conduct pediatric clinical trials in response to a written request from 
the FDA is clearly rising. Many children's advocates and researchers argue that no 
matter the cost, the information learned from the studies is an invaluable benefit for 
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children. In the long term, it is probable that some of the cost of conducting the studies 
will be offset by health care cost savings; as appropriate labeling of drugs used in the 
pediatric population is increased, health outcomes will improve. 
The US General Accountability Office reported on the cost to the public of 
providing the brand named drugs with an additional 6 months of market exclusivity, as 
this delays consumer access to lower-cost generic drugs. Delaying access to lower cost 
generic drugs increases health care spending overall and may be particularly 
burdensome for those without prescription drug coverage that must pay for the drugs 
out-of-pocket (US GAO 2001 ). The FDA estimates that the delay in availability of generic 
drugs could increase national drug spending by about one half of one percent or on 
average about $695 million per year over a 20-year period (FDA Pediatric Exclusivity 
Provision Status Report to Congress 2001 ). The one half of one percent estimate is 
based on a report from The Health Care Financing Administration that indicates 
prescription drug spending reached just over $100 billion in 1999 and projected this 
figure would rise to about $185 billion by 2005 (Office of the Actuary, Health Care 
Financing Administration). 
Albeit the most recent, these figures are likely an underestimate of the actual 
cost to the public because the complexity, and subsequently, the cost to conduct 
pediatric clinical trials has risen so dramatically (Tufts Center for the Study of Drug 
Development 2007). A government accountability office report is mandated as part of 
the most current version of BPCA. This report is due no later than January 1, 2011 and 
must include, among other requirements, a description of the number and importance of 
drugs and biological products for children that are being tested and the importance of the 
labeling changes made as a result of the testing. It must also include the number and 
importance of drugs and biological products for children that are not being tested and 
possible reasons for lack of testing. There is currently no required reporting of an 
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estimate of cost to the public versus cost savings for improved pediatric health outcomes 
as a result of improved drug labeling. 
Should the incentive structure be modified? 
BPCA and PREA have a 5 year sunset clause that results in their continual re-
evaluation and scrutiny. With the passage of each version-from the pediatric 
exclusivity provision of FDAMA in 1997, to the first BPCA in 2002, followed by the 
reauthorization in 2007 --the pediatric exclusivity provision has been tweaked. We asked 
all of the elite stakeholders if they felt other "carrots" could be more effective. Generally, 
they were satisfied with the BPCA in its current form, particularly with the length of the 
market exclusivity. Cross-drug patent extension was one suggestion for improvement. 
Benjamin, of Duke University, suggested, "The only thing I could see really being as 
effective or more effective is if the agency were able to give patent extension for trials 
conducted in other arenas to block-bluster drugs. For example, if a company was able 
to successfully develop a malaria vaccine ... then they got an extra 6 months' patent 
extension for an SSRI or an antacid or a lipid lowering agent, a multibillion-dollar drug .. 
. that might incentivize large companies to put resources into HIV vaccines or malaria 
vaccines or a message to supply safe water ... " (Benjamin interview, 2008). Several 
elites mentioned a gradation system for the incentive based on earning potential or 
usefulness in pediatric population. Overall, the interviews with the key elite stakeholders 
did not leave us with the impression that BPCA and PREA were in need of a major 
overhaul. 
Of note, three stakeholders mentioned that the sunset clause was a drain on 
resources or functioned as a barrier to progress. Dr. Maldonado, Vice President of 
Pediatric Drug Development at Johnson & Johnson, feels it prevents drug manufacturers 
from fully committing to a pediatric drug development infrastructure. He furthered, "After 
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10 years, I'm still somewhat dismayed to see that industry has not created a very strong 
infrastructure for pediatric drug development. .. 1 talked to my management [about 
this] ... and they pointed to a policy that keeps changing every 5 years. They said, 'You 
have a sunset clause ... This whole issue of BPCA may disappear. .. or it may be 
modified.' So they're very reluctant to create an infrastructure .... for a moving target." 
Although ongoing evaluation of the BPCA and PREA programs is vital, removal of the 
sunset clause may cause drug manufacturers to finally acknowledge that pediatric drug 
development is here to stay and they ought to fund and create the appropriate 
infrastructure within their organizations. 
The most pressing pediatric therapeutic needs 
The majority of the elite stakeholders, although they represented different 
domains, had practiced clinical pediatrics. They had strong feelings regarding the gaps 
in pediatric therapeutics. They identified the following areas of need: the study of 
generics, neonates, pediatric formulations, old antibiotics, acute diseases, and 
information transfer (how we translate what we know into practice). Others mentioned 
the need for more well-trained pediatric investigators and clinical pharmacologists, a 
better understanding of subtypes of disease (e.g., bipolar disorder vs. hyperactivity) so 
that clinical trial design can become more sophisticated (e.g., genotype testing}, and 
improved collaboration between medicine and pharmacy. 
The elite interviews also revealed financial tension. An academic expert noted 
that "We've got to figure out how to deal with a for-profit world and a not-for-profit 
population ... I think we need to deal with fact that the profit motive is driving chronic 
disease therapy. So acute treatment, which is what most kids have, acute diseases are 
lagging. [That's] because you make money on people who take a lot of medicine for a 
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long period of time." This comment likely explains part of the underlying reason why few 
systemic antibiotics are studied in children. 
It is unethical not to study children. Several respondents mentioned the 
ethics of conducting pediatric research. Mr. Delmonte of the AAP, best summarized 
their sentiment, "Our basic premise about this is not radical. It's pretty basic. Kids are 
people and deserve what adults have. The problem is: kids are not little adults. You 
can't just extrapolate the data. Kids are hard to study. The populations are smaller. 
You're going to have to think creatively, and it will be expensive, and that's too bad. 
1977 was the first time the American Academy of Pediatrics spoke on this, and said a 
groundbreaking thing, which was, 'It is not unethical to study drugs in kids. It's unethical 
not to."' (Delmonte interview, 2008). Despite the fact that pediatric research is 
complicated, expensive, and requires a commitment to ethical practice, the elite 
stakeholders passionately agreed that pediatric research must be conducted. 
Policy Recommendations 
Our policy analysis included a systematic review of the biomedical literature, 
review of public documents, and content analysis of interviews with key elite 
stakeholders. This triangulation of methods created a very rich dataset yielding insight 
into the history, strengths, and weaknesses of BPCA and PREA. We believe the 
following policy recommendations could further enhance the success of these laws. 
Removal of the sunset clause. So long as the legislation can "sunset," as 
Maldonado noted, industry sees it as a "moving target"- and, by extension, will be 
unlikely to devote the resources to development of permanent infrastructure for pediatric 
development. The simplest and yet potentially most important policy change we 
recommend is to remove the sunset clause. BPCA and PREA permanence -subject 
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only to the regular reauthorization affecting most policy- would both motivate 
manufacturers, and keep their feet to the fire. We should note that two elites disagreed 
with removing the sunset clause, since they believe the period of incentives should end, 
and pharmaceutical companies should simply adjust to maintaining the infrastructure 
necessary to do pediatric research. 
Limited liability protection in lieu of unlimited incentive. Once pediatric 
clinical trials infrastructure has been firmly established, government could offer limited 
liability protection -understood by both plaintiffs and defendants to be in effect (to 
prevent Vioxx-like scenarios of no end to the number of lawsuits), perhaps organized 
similarly to the liability protections created for vaccine development. Government can 
continue to offer the patent exclusivity incentive, but it should remain limited to an 
extension of six months' duration. Further, to maintain some balance between industry 
benefit and public good, profits above $500 million earned during the extension period 
will be subject to a special surcharge tax, the revenues from which will be devoted to 
pediatric studies of off patent drugs. Further incentives are unwarranted if the requested 
studies are feasible, infrastructure is adequate, and the manufacturer is offered limited 
liability protection for accepting the risks associated with studying a vulnerable 
population. We recognize that attempting to cap what might otherwise be viewed as the 
workings of the market is controversial, but the patent extension itself alters market 
dynamics, and does so for the purpose of achieving a clear public goal. Our present 
recommendation is in the spirit of continued attempts to balance market value with the 
health care needs of children. 
Published study guidelines. As of yet, the FDA has not published a 
comprehensive guide to the conduct of pediatric clinical trials. Others, such as Pasquali 
et al. and Benjamin et al., have analyzed study designs and endpoints to increase the 
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success of future pediatric clinical trials. The FDA also publishes a generic Guidance to 
Industry document for pediatric studies (Department of Health and Human Services 
2000). Although such publications are helpful, they are not comprehensive. The 
Pediatric Advisory Committee at the FDA should be charged with overseeing the 
development of a comprehensive resource to guide drug manufacturers in the conduct 
of pediatric clinical trials, including thoroughly developed manuals of methods, ethics, 
assays, and all such questions unique to pediatric trials, as well as other communication 
venues, such as a forum for discussion and exchange. Congress can provide necessary 
appropriations, perhaps in the next reauthorization of the bills, to allow the FDA to award 
grants, task order contracts, or other funding mechanisms to enable academic 
researchers at the Academic Medical Centers (AMCs) to begin the process by 
conducting evidence reviews on which such guidelines can be built. We also 
recommend the development of a "Pediatric CONSORT" for the reporting of pediatric 
trial data. Information to aid researchers in conducting and reporting trials is not enough, 
however. Pediatric research needs to be disseminated in such a way that it can 
influence practice. 
Dissemination of information. We require genuinely usable mechanisms for 
dissemination of pediatric study results. Some stakeholders advocate for requiring drug 
manufacturers to publish the results of studies conducted under BPCA and PREA in a 
peer-reviewed journal to be eligible for the incentive (Benjamin et al. 2006), going so far 
as to say that Congress should consider mandating peer-reviewed publication. As at 
least one of our elites noted, it is not clear that scientific journals can be forced to publish 
articles, but the need for dissemination is clear, and the FDA's "Summaries of Medical 
and Pharmacological Reviews of Pediatric Studies" (see 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/pediatric/Summaryreview.htm) is not likely to become widely 
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used by the practice community. Dissemination is so important that the Pediatric 
Advisory Committee at the FDA should be charged with the responsibility of overseeing 
a program to develop the necessary evidence reports and guidelines (see below) to 
assure that the results of studies conducted under BPCA and PREA can be more readily 
translated into practice. As we have noted, it is unlikely that community providers 
regularly visit the FDA website. The FDA and the Pediatric Advisory Committee, 
however, can work with the AAP, the AAFP and state pediatric and family medicine 
societies to provide regular- perhaps quarterly- updates of label changes, new 
indications, and other safety and effectiveness news. AMCs are an important resource 
to the FDA and the practice societies, who should take advantage of AMC expertise to 
accomplish these goals. If we cannot compel peer-reviewed publication, we can 
nonetheless require that studies be designed and conducted with sufficient rigor that 
results would be "publishable," even if we cannot mandate "publication," and it is also 
true that we have two precedents for encouraging the dissemination of results. First, the 
Evidence Reports created by the federally funded Evidence-based Practice Centers are 
almost always accompanied by reviews published in peer-reviewed journals, as a way of 
disseminating findings more quickly into practice. Second, the NIH has begun requiring 
that research supported by federal funds be published in such a way that relevant 
communities have open access to the publications. Both precedents fit our case, since 
the goals of the legislation are to create and disseminate evidence, and we can argue 
that patent exclusivity incentives are, in fact, public support of research. We recognize 
that this recommendation may even call for the creation of a new journal - perhaps an 
internet-based peer-reviewed journal like the PLoS (Public Library of Science) journals 
(see www.plos.org). We also note that this recommendation comports with but is distinct 
from the recommendation about disclosure of study information in the label, because we 
are calling for additional peer-review, and because some study results are not "label-
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worthy," but nonetheless should enter the public evidence base in the interest of 
complete transparency. 
In conclusion, some off-label drug is likely always to be necessary in the practice 
of pediatrics- some drugs are likely never to get the kind of clinical trial studies that 
label indications require, and yet their use will continue to be a part of common practice. 
This does not mean, however, that children do no deserve the same standard of care as 
do adults. The authors and supporters of BPCA and PREA have done a great service to 
children's health. 
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Appendix 1: In-depth Interview Protocol 
Better Medicines for Children: The Potential Policy Effects of the BPCA and PREA 
on Pediatric Drug Development, Labeling, and Use: 
A Study by Carrie Lee, MD, 
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Information Sheet 
IRB Study# Consent Form Version Date: January 23, 2008 
Principal Investigator: Carrie Lee, MD 
UNC-Chapel Hill Department: Public Health Leadership Program 
Faculty Advisor: Sue Tolleson-Rinehart PhD 
UNC-Chapel Hill Department: UNC Center for Education and Research on 
Therapeutics and Departments of Public 
Health Leadership, Pediatrics, and Political 
Science 
Advisor Phone#: 
Advisor e-mail: 
(919) 843-9477 
suetr@unc.edu 
Study Contact telephone number: (919) 630-5304 
Study Contact email: clee@unch.unc.edu 
[Introductory script, embedding fact sheet and consent information]: 
Hello, my name is Carrie Lee. Thank you so much for talking with me today. I am a 
doctor doing my Medical Oncology fellowship and working in the Preventive Medicine 
program at The University of North Carolina. I am doing this research to complete my 
Master of Public Health degree at UNC. 
I have asked to talk to you today because you are an expert on pediatric pharmaceutical 
questions. I am interested in your general views and, more specifically, your views on 
the potential for policies to change pediatric drug labels and prescribing practices. 
My faculty advisor is Dr. Sue Tolleson-Rinehart, who is a faculty member of the UNC 
Schools of Public Health and Medicine. We have gotten IRB approval to conduct these 
interviews, and if you can bear with me for just a moment, I need to talk for just a moen! 
about the study information I sent you in my e-mail message of [insert date]. 
As you recall, I told you that the interview has several open-ended questions, and that it 
will take about 20 minutes to an hour, depending on your time today, what you want to 
tell me. I do want to record this interview on a digital voice recorder to make absolutely 
sure that I have the most accurate record of your comments, but I won't do this without 
your permission. I will be transcribing the recording, and I will destroy the recording as 
soon as my Master's Paper has been accepted by the Graduate School. I will be happy 
to give you a copy of the transcript at your request. I will be keeping the transcription 
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until we publish the findings, but I will remove any identifying information from it unless 
you give me permission to identify you. As I mentioned in my e-mail message, you can 
withdraw your permission and you can stop the interview at any time. 
In my e-mail message, I mentioned that I would be protecting the digital recording of 
your interview on my password-protected computer, and Dr. Tolleson-Rinehart will also 
have a copy on her password-protected computer. Our computers have all the security 
requirements of the university and the School of Medicine. Do you have any questions 
about the recording? 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. Your choice of whether or not to 
participate will not influence your future relations with the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw your consent and to 
stop your participation at any time without penalty. At any point in the interview, you may 
refuse to answer any particular question or stop participation altogether. 
Dr. Tolleson-Rinehart and I intend to publish the results of this project, and will be glad to 
make findings available to you 
You are welcome to ask us anything about this research now or later. If you have 
questions later, please don't hesitate to contact me by phone or e-mail at the addresses I 
sent you in my e-mail message to you. I will be glad to send that contact information 
again. 
[If Respondent asks for contact information now: Dr. Lee: (919) 843-6281 or 
clee@unch.unc.edu. Dr. Tolleson-Rinehart: 919.843.9477 or suetr@unc.edu. 
Risks and Benefits: I don't know of any risk to you from completing this interview. 
don't know of any personal benefit you may get from participating, but I do believe that 
you will be helping the larger health care community by enabling us to understand how 
policies designed to increase pediatric prescribing safety can be most effective. 
Before we continue, would you please agree to any or all of the statements I'm about to 
read? 
D I AGREE to having this interview recorded with a digital voice recorder. 
D I GIVE PERMISSION for the following information to be included in publications 
resulting from this study: 
D my name D my title D direct quotes from this interview 
Name of Participant Date 
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Thank you for your help with my project! Now we are ready to begin. 
Pediatric Pharmaceutical Policy Questions: 
First, let me tell you my framework for the research. As you know, the Best 
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, or BPCA, came out of the FDA's Pediatric Rule. 
BPCA, as we know, gave legislative authority to the Pediatric Rule's intention of getting 
more manufacturers to provide pediatric data on safety and effectiveness. Of course , 
BPCA dealt with drugs that were already approved, and it was voluntary. The Pediatric 
Research Equity Act, or PREA, then came into being to require, rather than request, 
pediatric studies as a part of most new drug applications. My research is on the likely 
effects on pediatric therapeutics resulting from both BPCA and PREA. 
1. As you know, BPCA incentivizes the completion of pediatric studies by granting 
sponsors a 6-month patent extension on adult label indications, in exchange for 
conducting pediatric studies. Do you think this incentive is generally an attractive 
"carrot" for sponsors? Why? /Why not? Would other "carrots" be more effective? Would 
a "stick" be effective for drugs that have already been approved? 
2. Next, I want to read you a little summary of some thinking about BPCA. Some 
people argue that manufacturers might complete pediatric studies under BPCA in order 
to get a six month patent extension for adult label indications without ever intending to 
seek a pediatric label indication. Some think that getting the pediatric data is worth it, 
even without a new pediatric label. Others think that this is contrary to the spirit of the 
BPCA. 
a. What is your judgment about how all this has played out? 
b. Do you think getting the extension without seeking the label change has 
happened frequently? 
c. Do you think BPCA has actually motivated more new indications? 
d. Was this what the authors of BPCA expected, do you think- that they'd get more 
pediatric data, no matter what? Or do you think the supporters were hoping this would 
stimulate more pediatric labels? 
3. PREA, on the other hand, might be called all "stick," and no carrot, since it simply 
requires pediatric safety and efficacy data, with very few exceptions. And the 
consequences of not complying with PREA could be significant. If PREA's goal is to 
make sure that new drugs have pediatric indications, is PREA the right way to go about 
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this, or not? [if necessary, then probe with "Do you think having a drug labeled as 
'misbranded' is enough of a potential consequence to get manufacturers to comply?] 
4. The 2007 amendments to BPCA and PREA both require that pediatric studies, 
no matter their conclusions, be included in the label. I want to ask you a couple of 
questions about these new requirements. 
a. First, the amendments require including even inconclusive pediatric results in the 
label. What is the effect of publishing inconclusive results? For example, do you think 
this will make a difference to prescribers? 
b. Second, the amendments require publishing negative pediatric information on the 
label. Once again, what do you think the effect will be of publishing negative results? 
And will this have any effect on manufacturers' approach to completing their NDAs? 
5. What about doing the pediatric trials in the first place? I would like to have your 
views on pediatric drug development research generally. [If necessary, probe with "Well, 
I'd like to know anything you might want to say about cost, logistics, or ethics.] 
6. We are almost done! All things considered, where do you think pediatric 
therapeutics is today? What are our most pressing pediatric therapeutic needs? [If 
necessary, probe with "Those needs might be whatever you think is most important. .. ?] 
a. Do policies like BPCA and PREA get us to the goals you believe are most 
important? Take [the first thing somebody mentions, whatever it is]: how do you see 
BPCA and PREA helping with that? 
b. If you could recommend more, or different, pediatric therapeutic policy, what you 
want to see? 
That's it! We are finished! Thank you so very much for your time and thoughts! 
Do you have any additional questions or comments? Would you like a copy of this 
interview once it is transcribed? Thank you again! 
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